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                            __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         Nopporn Sriyuth appeals his conviction of kidnapping 
and use of a firearm in relation to the kidnapping in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 924(c), respectively.  We are 
asked to decide, inter alia, whether the district court erred in 
failing to exclude evidence, under Federal Rules of Evidence 
404(b) and 403, that the purpose or motive for the kidnapping was 
for companionship or sexual assault of the victim.   
         We find that the sexual assault evidence was probative 
of motive as well as the victim's nonconsent to the interstate 
transportation and, therefore, was admissible under rule 404(b).  
Moreover, given the facts here, the probative value of the sexual 
assault evidence outweighed the risk of undue prejudice.  
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
                                I. 
         At the root of the criminal conduct which occurred here 
lies the Laotian custom of arranged marriages.  Nopporn Sriyuth, 
also known as "Thi", is a naturalized citizen of the United 
States having immigrated to this country from Thailand in 1985.  
The victim, Chindavone Phongsavath, whose nickname is "Von," has 
resided with her family in Detroit since 1985.  Sriyuth met Von 
at her brother-in-law's house while he was in Detroit temporarily 
on business in 1990, and they became friends.   
         After Sriyuth left Detroit, Von and other members of 
her family kept in contact with him either by phone or letter.  
Von was not romantically involved with Sriyuth during this time.  
Von's mother and sister, however, contacted his mother to discuss 
an arranged marriage between Von and Sriyuth.  Von expressed to 
Sriyuth as well as to her family her objection to such an 
arrangement. 
         In November 1993, Sriyuth came to Detroit to stay with 
Von's sister Kethkeo and her husband.  Von, however, was 
romantically involved with Nala Chanta at that time.  Von's 
family still felt that Sriyuth was the perfect husband for Von.  
They therefore encouraged Sriyuth to take Von away for awhile so 
she would forget about her boyfriend.  Immediately prior to the 
kidnap in April 1994, Sriyuth obtained a nine millimeter Taurus 
handgun from a friend of Von's family.   
         At approximately 4:30 p.m. on April 5, 1994, Von was     
visiting her boyfriend Nala Chanta in the bedroom of his 
residence.  Without knocking and with gun in hand, Sriyuth 
entered Chanta's residence where he encountered two of Chanta's 
roommates playing a video game.  Sriyuth inquired as to Von's 
whereabouts and the roommates informed him that she was upstairs.  
Sriyuth proceeded upstairs in search of Von and, upon finding her 
in Chanta's bedroom, demanded that Von leave with him, grabbed 
her by the arm, and pulled her out of the room and down the 
stairs.  When he reached the bottom of the stairs, Sriyuth looked 
back at Chanta at the top of the stairs, with his gun pointed at 
him, and said, "I told you not to fuck with me."  Sriyuth then 
left Chanta's house with Von. 
         Once outside, Von pleaded with Sriyuth to let her drive 
home as she did not trust him.  Sriyuth, however, forced her into 
the driver's side of his car and told her he was taking her home.  
When Von refused to move over into the passenger seat, Sriyuth 
responded, "Move over!  Do you want to die?"  As they drove off, 
Von told Sriyuth to take her home; Sriyuth instead drove off in a 
different direction.  Von continued to ask Sriyuth to drive her 
home.  At one point while Sriyuth was still driving in Michigan, 
Von tried to get out of the car in order to force Sriyuth to 
stop.  Sriyuth had to pull into a gas station and Von ran out of 
the car crying and holding the gun.  Sriyuth ran after her and 
placed her in a bear hug.  He then apologized and told Von that 
he was going to take her home and asked her to get back in the 
car.  Sriyuth escorted Von back to the car.  Von testified that 
at this point, she believed that Sriyuth was going to take her 
home. 
         Sriyuth, however, did not drive towards Von's 
residence, but told her he was driving to work and that she could 
take the car and drive home.  Again, Von believed that Sriyuth 
was telling her the truth.  Shortly thereafter, Von realized they 
were headed south on the freeway towards Ohio, not in the 
direction of Sriyuth's place of employment.  She protested, again 
demanding that Sriyuth take her home.  Von reached over at one 
point and grabbed the steering wheel, causing the car to swerve.  
Sriyuth told her to stop and remarked, "You want to die, you know 
we can both die together.  I'm not afraid to die."   Eventually, 
Von realized they had crossed into Ohio when they entered the 
Ohio Turnpike.   
         When Sriyuth stopped to get gas at a gas station in 
Ohio, Von ran from the car and into the bathroom.  After using 
the facilities, Von remained in the restroom for approximately 
ten to fifteen minutes.  Eventually, Sriyuth came into the 
women's restroom looking for her.  He was trying to talk to her 
when an employee of the gas station came in and asked him to 
leave.  Sriyuth complied and shortly thereafter, the employee 
returned to the restroom with the keys to Sriyuth's car and a 
message from him--that Von could drive.  Von took the keys with 
the understanding that she would be allowed to drive home.  After 
Von stepped outside, however, Sriyuth grabbed the keys from her 
and carried her back to the car.  Although Von considered telling 
the employee in the restroom what was going on or asking her to 
call the police, Von decided against it because she still 
believed at that point she would be allowed to go home and 
because Sriyuth was a friend of the family. 
         Sriyuth continued to drive east through Ohio, while Von 
kept demanding to go home to Detroit.  At times Von became very 
angry and pounded on the dashboard and door to try to get Sriyuth 
to stop the car.  Sriyuth, however, ignored her requests.  After 
he had been driving awhile, Sriyuth pulled off to the side of the 
road to rest.  Sriyuth made several sexual advances towards Von, 
such as kissing her, forcing her to kiss him back, and trying to 
remove her pants, all of which Von vigorously rejected.  In a 
final attempt to thwart Sriyuth's advances, Von ran from the car, 
only to be caught and returned to the car by Sriyuth.   
         The next morning, now April 6, 1994, Sriyuth arrived in 
Scranton, Pennsylvania, where he encountered an old acquaintance.  
After some discussion, Sriyuth and his friend Lem drove 
separately to the house of a mutual friend located at 615 Court 
Street in Scranton.  After arriving at the Court Street location, 
Sriyuth and Lem went into the house while Von remained in the 
car.  Five to ten minutes later, the owner of the house, Laksana 
Sphabmixay came out to the car and asked Von to come in and get 
something to eat, apparently unaware of how Von came to be with 
Sriyuth in Scranton.  Von finally agreed and went inside the 
house. 
         For the most part, Von remained in the living room on 
the sofa, except to use the bathroom on one occasion.  Later that 
morning, Von asked Sriyuth to give her the keys to the car so she 
could go to the store to purchase some contact lens solution.  
Sriyuth refused to give her the keys but later drove her to the 
pharmacy.  Around 2:30 p.m., the owners of the house left to go 
to work.  Sometime in the late afternoon, Sriyuth, accompanied by 
Laksana's brother, went to two Western Union offices in an 
attempt to obtain the cash that he thought had been wired to him 
by Von's sister, Kethkeo.   While they were gone, Von telephoned 
Chanta and her sister, Vila.  She gave them the address and phone 
number of the house in Scranton.  Tearfully, she told Vila that 
Sriyuth had made sexual advances to her.  Vila told her she would 
come and get her, but Von told her to wait because Sriyuth told 
her he was going to take her home tomorrow. 
         At some point after Sriyuth returned, Von went upstairs 
to use the bathroom.  Sriyuth went upstairs to see what was 
taking Von so long.  She told him she just wanted to be alone for 
awhile.  He said he was going to play some pool with his friend.  
Von told him to go, but she was going to stay.  She went back 
into the bathroom and when she emerged ten to fifteen minutes 
later, Sriyuth was there waiting for her.  He blocked her access 
to the stairs so she ended up in the bedroom.  She sat down on 
the floor and wrapped her arms around her legs.  Sriyuth picked 
her up and placed her on the bed.  Shortly thereafter, Sriyuth 
became sexually aggressive with Von, ripping her body suit to 
remove it.  She attempted to fight off Sriyuth's advances by 
biting, scratching, and pushing him, and by telling him to stop.  
Sriyuth ultimately raped her.  Afterwards, Sriyuth told Von to go 
to sleep and if she tried to move, he would start attacking her 
again.   
         Before Sriyuth woke the next morning, Von slipped out 
of bed and went into the bathroom to take a bath.  Dressed in her 
jeans and tee-shirt, Von quietly walked downstairs and exited the  
house.  She walked as fast as she could until she came to a house 
with a light on.  Von knocked on the door and when two elderly 
women answered, she asked them if she could use their phone to 
call the police.  She told them that she had been kidnapped and 
raped.  The women allowed Von to call the police from their 
house.  The police arrived a short while later; one of the 
officers interviewed Von for approximately one hour and then took 
her to a hospital for a rape examination.  From the hospital, 
Von was taken to police headquarters in Scranton, where she was 
interviewed by Special Agent Seidel of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.   
         Based on the information Von gave to the police 
officer, officers were dispatched to apprehend Sriyuth.  The 
officers found Sriyuth in the upstairs bedroom still asleep.  He 
was taken into custody and transported to police headquarters.  
The vehicle driven by Sriyuth from Detroit to Scranton was 
impounded by the Scranton Police.  After obtaining Von's 
statement, the police officers were able to obtain a search 
warrant for the impounded vehicle; the search revealed a nine 
millimeter handgun in the glove compartment.  
         Later that day, Agent Seidel interviewed Sriyuth at the 
Scranton Police Headquarters in the presence of Officer Victor 
Sanguiliano and Detective Captain Ted Maus.  Prior to any 
questioning, Agent Seidel read Sriyuth his constitutional rights 
which he waived.  Sriyuth then proceeded to give a statement to 
Agent Seidel that essentially mirrors the testimony of Von and 
the other witnesses.  Prior to trial, Sriyuth filed a motion to 
suppress this statement.  After a hearing on August 1, 1994, the 
district court ruled at the Pre-Trial Conference that the 
defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights and accordingly denied the motion.     
         Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, Sriyuth 
filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude the government from 
introducing any evidence that the purpose or motive for the 
alleged kidnapping was for a sexual assault.  The district court 
denied his motion orally at the Pre-Trial Conference on January 
30, 1995 without stating a basis for its ruling.  The jury trial 
began the next day and, at the end of the government's case, 
defense counsel moved for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 
29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The district 
court denied the motion.  Thereafter, Sriyuth was found guilty on 
both charges.  Following the jury's verdict, defense counsel 
renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal, as well as filed a 
motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the district 
court in a Memorandum and Order dated September 14, 1995.   This 
appeal followed. 
         We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.    
          
                               II. 
         First and foremost, Sriyuth contends that the district 
court erred in failing to preclude the government from 
introducing any evidence at trial that the purpose or motive for 
the alleged kidnapping was for gaining Von's companionship and 
for a sexual assault.  Initially, he argues that because motive 
is not an element of the offense of kidnapping, the sexual 
assault evidence is not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 
401.  Alternatively, Sriyuth claims that none of the exceptions 
to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which precludes 
the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to 
prove a person's character, applies here.  Finally, Sriyuth 
contends that the probative value of this evidence does not 
outweigh the harmful consequences which would result from its 
admission and thus should have been excluded under Rule 403 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.       
         Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence."  Fed. R. 
Evid. 401.  Relevant evidence will be admissible unless the rules 
of evidence provide to the contrary.  United States v. Scarfo, 
850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988) 
(citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988)); 
see also Fed. R. Evid. 402.  Rule 404(b), although viewed as a 
rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, provides for the 
exclusion of relevant evidence in certain situations.  
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688-89; Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1019.  
Specifically, Rule 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts to prove a person's character; 
however, such evidence may be admissible to show "motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident."  Thus, "[t]he threshold inquiry 
a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under 
Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of a material 
issue other than character."  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686.   
         Once it has been determined that the other crimes 
evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the balancing test of 
Rule 403 must also be met.  Accordingly, relevant other crimes 
evidence may be excluded if the probative value of the evidence 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.  
Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1019 (citation omitted).   
         In order to gauge whether the sexual assault evidence 
is relevant we must first look to the plain language of the 
kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).  Section 1201(a) states 
in pertinent part:   
         Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, 
         inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or 
         carries away and holds for ransom or reward 
         or otherwise any person, when: 
  
              (1) the person is willfully transported 
         in interstate or foreign commerce; 
 
         . . . 
 
         shall be punished by imprisonment for any 
         term of years or for life. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (emphasis added).  The focus of our 
inquiry centers initially on the statutory language that the 
victim be held "for ransom, reward or otherwise."   
         After examining the legislative history of the 1936 
amendment to section 1201 and pertinent Supreme Court cases, the 
court of appeals in Gawne v. United States, 409 F.2d 1399, 1402- 
03 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970), concluded 
that "obviously `otherwise' comprehends any purpose at all."  
(citation omitted).  Because "otherwise" was intended to mean 
"any other reason," the court held that defendants' purpose for 
the kidnapping was not an element of the offense.  Id. at 1403. 
         The government maintains that because "purpose" is an 
element of kidnapping and, in order to sustain its burden of 
proof as to this element it was required to present evidence of 
the sexual assault, purpose was therefore relevant to prove the 
offense of kidnapping.  In support of this argument, the 
government cites a number of cases which hold generally that 
evidence of "some purpose" was sufficient to satisfy the federal 
kidnapping statute.  See United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 
950, 953 (8th Cir. 1990); (evidence of sexual assault sufficient 
to show "some purpose of his own"); United States v. McBryar, 553 
F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862 (1977) (evidence 
of sexual gratification sufficient to meet "or otherwise" 
requirement); United States v. Lutz, 420 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970) (evidence of rape sufficient to 
satisfy "or otherwise" element).  In United States v. McCabe, 812 
F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832 (1987), the 
court of appeals stated that "`Congress by the phrase "or 
otherwise" intended to include any object of a kidnaping which 
the perpetrator might consider of sufficient benefit to himself 
to induce him to undertake it.'"  (quoting United States v. 
Wolford, 444 F.2d 876, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
         The district court agreed with the government and held 
that the rape was admissible to show motive, citing among other 
cases United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983).  Bradshaw argued that 
evidence of his sexual activity with the victim should have been 
excluded as irrelevant under Rule 404(b) or, if relevant, was 
unduly prejudicial pursuant to Rule 403.  We find the language of 
the court of appeals particularly instructive:       
 
         Evidence of drug use and sexual relations 
         with a nine-year-old boy was obviously 
         prejudicial to the defendant.  But it was 
         also relevant to show Bradshaw's dominion 
         over [the victim].  The contention that the 
         victim consented to the trip, and, therefore, 
         that he was not kidnapped, made the evidence 
         of sex and drug activity occurring after the 
         kidnapping admissible.  See Holden v. United 
         States, 388 F.2d 240, 242 (1st Cir.), cert. 
         denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968). 
 
         . . . 
 
         Motive is evidence of the commission of any 
         crime.  This Court has previously held 
         evidence of sexual relations admissible 
         because of its relevance to motive in a 
         kidnapping case.  See United States v. 
         Gibson, 625 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1980).  It was 
         pointed out in Gibson that while there may be 
         no substantial issue of motive under section 
         1201(a), "the subsequent conduct does tend to 
         present a picture, the whole of which 
         indicates guilt. . . . The picture of a 
         kidnapping is not complete unless all of the 
         relationships of the defendant to the victim, 
         from the beginning of the illegal detention 
         to the end of it, are shown."  Id. at 888.  
         (footnote omitted.) 
 
690 F.2d at 708-09.   As in Bradshaw, the evidence of Sriyuth's 
sexual assault of Von is relevant to show not only his motive 
in kidnapping her, but also that she did not consent to go with 
him.   
         With respect to Sriyuth's Rule 404(b) argument, we 
conclude that it must fail for two reasons.  First, the evidence 
is probative of a material issue other than his character--motive 
and the victim's consent--and thus falls within the permissible 
uses of other crimes evidence.  In addition, "[w]hen the evidence 
of another crime is necessary to establish an element of the 
offense being tried, there is no `other crime.'"  United States 
v. Blyden, 964 F.2d 1375, 1378 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here the rape 
evidence was probative of the victim's lack of consent to the 
kidnapping and, therefore, was an element of section 1201(a).  
This evidence also explains why Von suddenly decided to report 
the kidnapping to the police; without it, her actions in this 
case make no sense.  The government had no other means available 
to it to prove this element.  As a result, we conclude the rape 
evidence was highly probative of a material element of 
kidnapping.   
         Our analysis does not end here, however, as relevant 
evidence will be admissible so long as its probative value 
substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.  Fed. 
R. Evid. 403; Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1019.  In applying this test, 
we must assess the "genuine need for the challenged evidence and 
balance that necessity against the risk that the information will 
influence the jury to convict on improper grounds."  Id.  (citing 
United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1003 (3d Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 54 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1987)).  In Cook, 
we recited several factors to be considered in the balancing 
process: 
         . . . we must balance the actual need for 
         that evidence in view of the contested issues 
         and the other evidence available to the 
         prosecution, and the strength of the evidence 
         in proving the issue, against the danger that 
         the jury will be inflamed by the evidence to 
         decide that because the accused was the 
         perpetrator of the other crimes, he probably 
         committed the crime for which he is on trial 
         as well. . . .  The treasured principles 
         underlying the rule against admitting 
         evidence of other crimes should be relaxed 
         only when such evidence is genuinely needed 
         and would be genuinely relevant.  (footnote 
         omitted.) 
 
Cook, 538 F.2d at 1003 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 492 
F.2d 1141, 1150 (5th Cir. 1974)).  We noted that a significant 
danger of undue prejudice will be found to exist where there are 
"substantial possibilities . . . that a jury will harbor strong 
adverse sensitivity" to the challenged evidence.  Id. at 1004.  
In order to overcome this significant risk of unfair prejudice, 
the government must prove necessity.  Id.   
         Although Sriyuth contends that "[i]t was likely that 
the rape evidence contributed to the jury's verdict," we are 
convinced that this evidence was genuinely needed and relevant to 
proving the kidnapping.  In our view, the rape evidence is 
strongly probative because it counters two central arguments 
advanced by Sriyuth.  First it rebuts Sriyuth's claim that he 
transported Von to Pennsylvania with her consent to further the 
arranged marriage.  Evidence that a rape occurred during the 
kidnapping, even after the predicate elements had been met, made 
the government's account more likely than without this evidence.  
Second, the rape evidence refutes Sriyuth's argument that Von's 
delay in notifying the police showed that she went with Sriyuth 
willingly.  In any event, the risk of unfair prejudice was 
minimized by the district court's instruction to the jury on the 
limited use of the sexual assault evidence.  As in Driggs, we 
believe this is a case where the "jury could be expected to 
compartmentalize the evidence and consider it for its proper 
purposes."  823 F.2d at 54.       
         Accordingly, we find that the sexual assault evidence 
was relevant and that its probative value substantially 
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to Sriyuth.  The 
district court properly allowed the government to present 
evidence of the motive for the kidnapping. 
 
                               III. 
         Sriyuth's other allegations of error need not detain us 
long as they lack legal merit. 
 
                                A. 
         Sriyuth challenges the district court's order denying 
the suppression of his statement to Agent Seidel.  His objection 
is two-fold:  his statement was not made knowingly or 
intelligently as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), and his statement was involuntary, having been obtained 
through the exertion of promises or improper influence by Agent 
Seidel.  We find no merit in either argument.   
         Our review of the district court's finding that Sriyuth 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
counsel is subject to plenary review, but we are required to 
accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  
United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 317 (1991)).  In determining 
whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent under 
Miranda, we are required to make a two-pronged inquiry.  We must 
first ask whether the waiver was voluntary "`in" the sense that 
it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion or deception.'"  United States v. 
Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1017 (1990) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 
(1986) (citation omitted)).  Second, we must inquire whether the 
waiver was "`made with a full awareness both of the nature of the 
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it.'"  Id.   
         This inquiry requires us to consider the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, which includes 
examining the events that occurred and the background, 
experience, and conduct of the defendant.  Alston v. Redman, 34 
F.3d 1237, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1122 
(1995) (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983) 
(additional citations omitted)).  Miranda rights will be deemed 
waived only where the totality of the circumstances "`reveal[s] 
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 
comprehension.'"  Id. (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421) (citations 
omitted).                            
         At the suppression hearing, Agent Seidel testified that 
he was "absolutely certain" that Sriyuth understood him.  Agent 
Seidel stated that, in turn, he did not have any trouble 
understanding Sriyuth, who spoke English.  Indeed, Seidel did not 
have any concerns whatsoever that there might have been 
difficulties with communication.  Agent Seidel testified that he 
explained briefly what the victim said occurred and asked Sriyuth 
if he wanted to talk to him about it.  According to Agent Seidel, 
Sriyuth indicated that he did want to talk to him, at which point 
Sriyuth was taken to Detective Maus' office where the waiver of 
rights form was read and explained to him.   
         Agent Seidel was certain that Sriyuth understood his 
rights and that he did not wish to have an attorney present for 
the interview.  In response to Agent Seidel telling him that he 
could have an attorney present, Sriyuth allegedly stated that he 
wanted to tell the agent his story, and then, before the hearing, 
he wished to speak to an attorney.  At no point during the 
interview did the defendant indicate that he wished to stop or 
that he wanted an attorney present.   
         Agent Seidel also testified that he did not make any 
promises to coerce Sriyuth into talking without a lawyer either 
before or after Sriyuth signed the waiver of rights form.  After 
the interview was over, Agent Seidel told Sriyuth he thought he 
had done the right thing by telling the truth and, at some point 
down the road, Seidel would go to bat for him since he had 
cooperated with the authorities.  Detective Maus and Officer 
Sangiuliano were also present when the waiver of rights form was 
read and executed, and they corroborated Agent Seidel's account 
of what transpired. 
         To the contrary, Sriyuth testified that he immediately 
requested an attorney, and that before he signed the waiver 
form, Agent Seidel promised him that he would put in a good word 
for him with the judge if he cooperated.  Sriyuth further stated 
that he understood his rights as they were read to him.  When 
asked specifically if he understood what "anything you say can be 
used against you in court" meant, he replied, "Yes, but I didn't 
really pay attention to that."  He stated that he agreed to the 
interview because he thought that if he got an attorney that day, 
he would just have to pay a fine and he would be released.  
Sriyuth also contested the substance of his statement to Agent 
Seidel as contained in the FBI 302 Report.  In particular, 
Sriyuth denied admitting to Agent Seidel that he kidnapped and 
raped Von.   
         According to Agent Seidel, at the time of the interview 
the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, nor did he appear to be mentally or physically disabled 
in any way.  At the suppression hearing, Sriyuth testified that 
he was twenty-three years old, had been in this country for nine 
years, and had attended high school in the United States for five 
years.  Since quitting school, Sriyuth managed a fast food 
restaurant and worked in construction; at the time he was 
arrested he was working for a grinding company.  Sriyuth also 
testified that he was not familiar with the criminal justice 
system.  He did, however, state that he knew he was entitled to a 
lawyer upon arrest from watching movies and the television show, 
"The People's Court."  Sriyuth was not handcuffed during the 
interview, which lasted approximately one hour. 
         The district court found that Sriyuth's testimony at 
the suppression hearing was not believable.  By crediting Agent 
Seidel's testimony, the district court in effect adopted the 
agent's version of the facts--that Sriyuth understood his rights, 
based on the number of years he has lived in the United States, 
his education and work experience; that Sriyuth did not request 
an attorney for the interview; and that Agent Seidel did not 
promise Sriyuth that he would put in a good word for him to 
coerce him into waiving his rights.  These findings are not 
clearly erroneous.  The record supports the denial of the motion 
because Sriyuth waived his rights freely and deliberately, and 
was not coerced into relinquishing them.  Moreover, his own 
testimony confirms that he understood the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of such abandonment.  We 
hold, therefore, that the district court did not err in 
concluding that Sriyuth voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel.  Accordingly, the district court 
properly denied the motion to suppress.  
   
                                B. 
         Sriyuth also contends that there was insufficient 
evidence for the jury to find that he held the victim against her 
will at the time he transported her across state lines.  
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed "to 
determine `whether, viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the government, there was substantial evidence upon 
which a reasonable jury could have based its verdict.'"  United 
States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 1660 (1994) (quoting United States v. Pungitore, 910 
F.2d 1084, 1129 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 915 
(1991)).  We find no merit in this argument.  It is clear from 
our review of the evidence that the government presented 
substantial evidence from which the jury could believe the victim 
did not consent to be transported across state lines. 
 
                                C. 
         The last two issues concern the district court's 
instructions to the jury.  The first objection involves the 
following charge:  
         The crime of kidnapping is complete when the 
         defendant willfully transports a person 
         against her will, and the person does, in 
         fact, cross state lines.  The offense of 
         kidnapping is complete, then any agreement by 
         the person to continue detention by the 
         defendant does not absolve the defendant of 
         the criminal responsibility.   
 
Sriyuth contends the jury charge incorrectly defined the offense 
of kidnapping, and, as a result, the jury failed to consider 
whether the victim was a consenting party at the time they 
crossed state lines.  We have held that if the jury charge 
"`fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to the 
jury [without confusing or misleading the jurors]'", then when 
viewed as a whole and in the light of the evidence, the court's 
instruction will not constitute reversible error.  United States 
v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1243 n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted); see also United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  Here, upon review of all of the instructions, it is 
clear that the district court fairly and adequately instructed 
the jury on the elements of the offense of kidnapping.  In 
particular, the court correctly instructed the jury that it must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was being 
transported unwillingly at the time she crossed into Ohio.  We 
find nothing in this instruction which would have confused or 
misled the jury. 
         The final objection involves the supplemental jury 
instruction given in response to a note received from the jury.  
After discussion with counsel outside the presence of the jury, 
the district court responded by giving the jury a written copy of 
his oral instruction on the elements of kidnapping.  Sriyuth 
objected to the fact that it was given in writing, but had no 
problem with the substance of the supplemental charge if reread 
to the jury.   
         In Beardshall v. Minuteman Press International, Inc., 
664 F.2d 23, 28 (3d Cir. 1981), we recognized that "the form and 
extent of supplemental instructions are within the sound 
discretion of the court."  There, the trial court submitted a 
written statement to the jury outlining the "bare bones" elements 
of fraud, instead of the original oral instruction which 
amplified the requirements for each element, including the 
relevant qualifications and distinctions of each.  We disapproved 
of the trial court's written instruction in Beardshall because it 
did not contain the qualifying instructions or the explanations 
of the original oral charge, and thus unduly emphasized the 
plaintiffs' theory of the case.  Id.  We did not preclude the use 
of written instructions, however, in the appropriate case, 
although we noted that the practice had risks.  In order to 
"avoid prejudicial emphasis on part of the case," we noted the 
trial court should "[remind] the jury of the other aspects of the 
original charge and [caution] them that the segment of the charge 
which is amplified or explained should be considered in the light 
of the other instructions and is not to be given undue weight."  
Id. at 29.  We are in agreement with the statement of our sister 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. 
Ehrlich, 902 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1069 (1991), that where initially the jury is charged orally but 
is later given written instructions in response to a request for 
supplemental instructions, "there [will be] no error unless, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the court's written 
response creates an unbalanced charge prejudicial to the 
defendant."  Id. at 330 (citation omitted). 
         Here we cannot say, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that the district court's written instruction 
created an unbalanced charge prejudicial to Sriyuth.  Unlike 
Beardshall, the district court submitted the entire jury 
instruction as originally given on the elements of kidnapping.  
Thus, there was no need to remind the jury of the other aspects 
of the original charge.  Although we note that the district court 
acknowledged the better practice may have been to read the 
supplemental instruction to the jury instead of submitting a 
written charge, we cannot say the court's choice resulted in 
placing undue emphasis on any aspect of the case.  
 
                               VI. 
         We find that the district court did not err in allowing 
the government to present the sexual assault evidence at trial or 
in denying the motion to suppress the defendant's statement to 
Agent Seidel.  We further hold that the government presented 
substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
the victim did not consent to be transported across state lines.  
Finally, we conclude that the district court acted within its 
sound discretion with regard to the challenged jury instructions.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment in this criminal case.   
                                  
